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COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE ON THE MARCH
E. A. Turk
Part 17"
A CCEPTANCE of the doctrine of comparative negligence in
the greater part of the world having been noted, it is now
proper to turn to the American scene for the purpose of observing
the extent of the reception of that doctrine in this country in areas
outside the scope of admiralty law.'
III. THE DocTINm IN AMERICAN CASE, LAW
It has already been pointed out that the contributory negligence
doctrine of Butterfield v. Forrester2 received a willing acceptance
in the American law courts shortly after its formulation.3 The
first two reported American cases dealing with mutual fault came
from Massachusetts and Vermont in 1824. Not only did the
courts there involve cite the English case, they both followed its
reasoning. 4 From then on, the spread of the contributory negli-
gence doctrine was such that, by the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury,- its victory in the common law courts over other possible
doctrines was virtually completed.6 Very little has occurred since
*Part I hereof appeared in 28 CHICAGO-KENT Lw REVIEW 189-245.
1 A discussion of the admiralty aspects of the subject appears above, pp. 231-8.
2 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (1809).
3 See Part I above, pp. 198-9.
4 Smith v. Smith, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 621, 13 Am. Dec. 464 (1824) ; Washburn v.
Tracy, 2 D. Chipman 128, 15 Am. Dec. 661 (Vt., 1824).
5 Details of its progress are given in Malone, "The Formative Era of Contrib-
utory Negligence," 41 Ill. L. Rev. 151 (1946).
6 Even in the early days, something like the silver line of comparative negligence
occasionally appears. In Noyes v. Town of Morristown, 1 Vt. 353 (1828), the
plaintiff tried to cross the defendant's bridge with his horse and buggy. Defects
in the bridge caused the horse to shy away and jump over a defective rail into
the water, where it was destroyed. The defense rested on the theory that the
loss resulted entirely from plaintiff's fault. The trial judge charged the jury that
plaintiff should recover in full If the damage was caused, either wholly or in
part, by defects In the bridge. The reviewing court held the charge erroneous,
as plaintiff would not be entitled to recover fully if his own negligence had con-
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then to unsettle the hold thus obtained, if statutory abolition or
modification of the doctrine, to be discussed later, is disregarded.
The state of the law in five American jurisdictions, to-wit: Georgia,
Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana and Tennessee, does, however, call for
special consideration.
A. lLINOIS DEVELOPMENTS
Starting with Illinois, it may be said that its Supreme Court,
apparently under the leadership of Justice Breese, undertook a
gallant attempt about the middle of the nineteenth century to
mitigate the harshness of the contributory negligence doctrine by
arranging for a comparison of a sort between the amounts of
negligence committed by the parties. In the case of The Aurora
Branch Railroad Company v. Grimes,7 decided in 1852, the
Illinois court had professed adherence to the contributory negli-
gence doctrine, had even cited the Butterfield case with approval,
by stating that if the plaintiff alone was in fault, or if both parties
were equally in fault, the plaintiff could not recover. Again, two
years later, in Chicago & Mississippi Railroad Company v. Patchin,8
it summed up the state of the law by saying: "While the courts
will . . . apply the enforcement of the strictest diligence, skill
and care, and for want of them, measure the liability for slight
negligence, yet the injured party must be free from such negli-
gence as contributes to the injury complained of. "9 But the
Grimes case may really have been the forerunner of a later de-
velopment. One statement in the opinion attracts attention. Said
the court: "The degree of care which the plaintiff is bound to
exercise . . . will depend upon the relative rights or position
of the parties."1 0
tributed to the damage. It said it was not then necessary to decide whether "the
damages may not be divisible, if the jury find the loss to be occasioned partly by
[plaintiff's] own fault and partly by the deficiency of the bridge." But the
possibility of arranging for some distribution of the damage in case the fault
was mutual was at least thought of.
7 13 Ill. 585 (1852).
8 16 Ill. 198 (1854).
9 16 Ill. 198 at 202.
10 13 Il1. 585 at 587.
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The picture definitely changes, in 1858, with the carefully
reasoned opinion of Justice Breese in the case of Galena & Chicago
Union Railroad Company v. Jacobs." True, the court still cited
the Butterfield case with approval, even to the point of quoting
Lord Ellenborough's off-hand remark that "two things must
concur to support this action, to-wit: fault on the part of the
defendant, and no want of ordinary care on the part of the plain-
tiff." But after a thorough examination of the English cases, it
reached the result that "the degrees of negligence must be meas-
ured, and wherever it shall appear that the plaintiff's negligence
is comparatively slight, and that of the defendant gross, he shall
not be deprived of his action. '112 As the basis for reaching that
result, the opinion added:
It will be seen [from the English cases discussed] that the
question of liability does not depend absolutely on the absence
of all negligence on the part of the plaintiff, but upon the
relative degree of care or want of care, as manifested by both
parties, for all care or negligence is at best but relative, the
absence of the highest possible degree of care showing the
presence of some negligence, slight as it may be. The true
doctrine, therefore, we think is, that in proportion to the
negligence of the defendant, should be measured the degree
of care required of the plaintiff-that is to say, the more
gross the negligence manifested by the defendant, the less
degree of care will be required of the plaintiff to enable
him to recover. Although these cases do not distinctly avow
this doctrine in terms, there is a vein of it very perceptible,
running through very many of them, as, where there are
faults on both sides, the plaintiff shall recover, his fault being
to be measured by the defendant's negligence, the plaintiff
need not be wholly without fault.'8
1120 111. 478 (1858).
12 20 Ill. 478 at 497. Italics added.
13 20 Ill. 478 at 492, 494 and 496. Justice Breese appears to have placed main
reliance on two English cases. In one of them, that of Raisin v. Mitchell, 9 Carr. &
Payne 613, 173 Eng. Rep. 979 (1839), the action was brought by the owner of one
vessel against the owner of another for an injury arising from a collision. There
was fault on both sides. Notwithstanding this, the plaintiff was held entitled to
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The worst aspect of the contributory negligence doctrine, one
which requires total absence of fault on plaintiff's part, was there
rejected. In the later case of St. Louis, Alton & Terre Haute
Railroad Company v. Todd,14 the court moved still farther away,
saying: "the rule of this court is, that negligence is relative,
and that a plaintiff, although guilty of negligence which may have
contributed to the injury, may hold the defendant liable, if he has
been guilty of a higher degree of negligence. . . '15
In the three decades that followed Justice Breese's opinion
aforementioned, a long line of cases was built up around the
nucleus that, in situations of mutual fault, a plaintiff had to show
that he had taken ordinary care for his own safety. Ifi he had
done so, but was guilty of some slight negligence in comparison
with the grosser negligence of the defendant, be was nevertheless
entitled to recover. A part of these decisions do not expressly
state the first element of the rule, to-wit: that the plaintiff must
have exercised ordinary care. They place more stress upon the
second element, i. e., the plaintiff was to be entitled to recover if
his negligence was slight as compared with the defendant's gross
negligence. 16  Other decisions, however, clearly state that the
plaintiff cannot recover if there was want of ordinary care on
the verdict on the ground that there might be fault in the plaintiff "to a certain
extent" without preventing his recovery. In the other, that of Lynch v. Nurdin,
1 Q. B. 29, 41 Eng. C. L. 422, 113 Eng. Rep. 1041 (1841), the defendant had negli-
gently left his cart and horse unattended in a thronged street. The plaintiff, a
child of seven years, got upon the cart in play. Another child incautiously led
the horse forward and plaintiff was thrown down and hurt. The defendant was
held liable, although the plaintiff had contributed to his mischief, since "his, the
child's misconduct bears no proportion to that of the defendant." See 1 Q. B. 29
at 39, 113 Eng. Rep. 1041 at 1044. Italics added.
14 36 Ill. 409 (1865).
15 36 Ill. 409 at 414. The quoted sentence ended with the words "amounting
to willful injury." The force of this additional language was nullified by further
discussion of the problem in which the court compared degrees of negligence only.
16 Wabash R. R. Co. v. Henks, 91 Ill. 406 (1879) ; I. C. R. R. Co. v. Hammer, 85
Ill. 526 (1877); Quinn v. Donovan, 85 Ill. 194 (1877) ; Schmidt v. C. & N. W. Ry.
Co., 83 Ill. 405 (1876) ; R., R. I. & St. L. R. R. Co. v. Delaney, 82 Ill. 198 (1876) ;
I. C. R. R. Co. v. Goddard, 72 Ill. 567 (1874); I. C. R. R. Co. v. Hammer, 72 Ill.
347 (1874); I. C. R. R. Co. v. Cragin, 71 Ill. 177 (1873); C. W. D. R. R. Co. v.
Bert, 69 Il1. 388 (1873) ; C., B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Payne, 59 Ill. 534 (1871) ; St. L.,
A. & T. H. R. R. Co. v. Todd, 36 Ill. 409 (1865). See also Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy R. R. Co. v. Dewey, 26 Ill. 255, 79 Am. Dec. 374 (1861).
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his part.17 Comparatively slight negligence, that is a want of
the highest grade of care, might be condoned; want of ordinary
care, never. The "slight negligence" contemplated by the rule,
as one reviewing court once put it, had to be "a degree of negli-
gence less than a failure to exercise ordinary care, and is a degree
of which the plaintiff may be guilty, even though in the exercise
of ordinary care." 8 Recovery was denied under this rule if the
defendant's carelessness simply exceeded that of the plaintiff19
or if the negligence of both stood equal.
20
The Illinois doctrine thus formulated was not what is now
generally understood as the doctrine relating to comparative
negligence. True, under the Illinois version, the negligence of
plaintiff and defendant was compared, but the end result was that
the plaintiff either recovered in full or got nothing at all. The ele-
ment providing for the apportionment of the damages, according
to the relative amounts of negligence displayed, was missing. The
lack of this element, one essential to a true comparative negli-
gence doctrine, may have been one of the reasons why the Illinois
rule failed to gain sufficient support and approval to keep it in
force. It may have been an unheard of thing, in those days, that
a negligent plaintiff should be permitted to recover in full and
many an adherent of the "old" contributory negligence doctrine
must have felt that one hardship had been substituted for an-
other.21 At any rate, the doctrine appears to have worked quite
satisfactorily for three decades and then it disappeared.
Professor Green has pointed out other and further reasons
17 City of Chicago v. Stearns, 105 Ill. 554 (1883) ; I. & St. L. R. R. Co. v. Evans,
88 Ill. 63 (1878) ; Schmidt v. C. & N. W. Ry. Co., 83 Ill. 405 (1876) ; Hund v. Geyer,
72 I1. 393 (1874); Grand Tower M. & T. Co. v. Hawkins, 72 I1. 386 (1874);
St. Louis & S. E. Ry. Co. v. Britz, 72 Ill. 256 (1874); R., R. I. & St. L. R. R. Co.
v. Hillmer, 72 Ill. 235 (1874); I. C. R. R. Co. v. Hall, 72 Il. 222 (1874); C. &
A. R. R. Co. v. Mock, 72 Ill. 141 (1874).
18 Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Moran, 13 Ill. App. 72 at 76 (1883).
19 Schmidt v. C. & N. W. Ry. Co., 83 Ill. 405 (1876) ; I. C. R. R. Co. v. Goddard,
72 Ill. 567 (1874) ; C, & A. R. R. Co. v. Mock, 72 Il1. 141 (1874).
20 1. & St. L. R. R. Co. v. Evans, 88 Il1. 63 (1878).
21 See Mole and Wilson, "A Study of Comparative Negligence," 17 Corn. L. Q.
604 (1932), particularly pp. 634-5; Whelan, "Comparative Negligence," 1938 Wis.
L. Rev. 465 at 467.
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for that disappearance. 22 He assigns, as one of them, that the
rule required the courts to attempt to operate a comparative negli-
gence doctrine along with a contributory negligence doctrine. In
that connection, it will be recalled that, before the comparison
of both negligences was allowed, the plaintiff first had to show
that he had exercised ordinary care.23  This, as Green says, re-
duced the area of comparative negligence to a minimum. 24 Again,
the courts became burdened with the job of applying the treble
degrees of negligence which had been developed to fit bailment
problems. The difficulties arising from an attempt to handle the
different degrees of slight, ordinary, and gross negligence could
well serve to discredit the doctrine. 25  Actually, this was all un-
necessary, because two unrelated concepts were being improperly
intermingled. Neither Justice Breese, in the Jacobs case, nor
the judges concerned with the bulk of the later cases, 26 had asked
for a determination of slight or gross negligence per se, a prob-
lem always productive of difficulty. The decision they wished
made was, rather, one of relativity, to-wit: whether plaintiff's
negligence was slight when compared with defendant's gross
negligence.
A further reason for abandoning the doctrine may rest in the
fact that an increase in the number of master and servant negli-
gence cases which occurred in the '80's would have forced a
heavier burden on employers, if the doctrine remained in effect,
than the courts may have thought it advisable for them to bear
at that time.27  There may have been some apprehension that
the center of gravity in such proceedings would slip from the
higher courts to the trial courts, from whence it might slip still
farther so as to end in the hands of the jury.28 Elliott adds, as
still another reason, that this so-called comparative negligence
22 Green, "Illinois Negligence Law," 39 Ill. L. Rev. 36 (1944), at p. 50 et seq.
23 Ibid., p. 50, citing numerous cases.
24 Ibid., p. 51.
25 Ibid., p. 51 et seq. See also C., B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Il1. 512
(1882), particularly pp. 522 and 527.
26 See cases cited in notes 16 and 17, ante.
27 Green, "Illinois Negligence Law," 39 Ill. L. Rev. 36 (1944), at p. 51.
28 Ibid., pp. 47 and 51.
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doctrine, during its probationary status in Illinois, was looked at,
both by courts in most other jurisdictions and by text writers,
with a degree of displeasure extending even unto hostility.
29
Whatever the reason or reasons, that which had been termed
a comparative negligence doctrine in Illinois gradually began to
disappear. The trend started with the case of Calumet Iron and
Steel Company v. Martin,30 decided in 1884. The jury had there
been instructed that the plaintiff might recover only if he exer-
cised "reasonable care and caution," that is, if he exercised "due
care." The defendant complained that the jury, instead, should
have been told that "plaintiff could recover only if [his] negli-
gence was slight and that of the defendant gross, in comparison
with each other." The court held that the instruction, as given,
was sufficient. Speaking through Judge Scholfield, it said:
The court has not understood that the rule of comparative
negligence changed or modified the general rule requiring
that the injured party, in order to recover . . . must have
observed due or ordinary care for his personal safety
it was not intended by the judges who decided the Jacobs
case, and the earlier cases following the ruling in that case,
that the rule of comparative negligence, as then announced,
was to have that effect. . . . No previous decision of this
court was assumed to be overruled. No new doctrine was
claimed to be announced.31
After reviewing a series of cases ranging from Chicago, Burling-
ton & Quincy Railroad Company v. Hazzard32 to the holding in
Chicago & Northwestern Railwayl Company v. Ryan,33 the opinion
29 See Elliott, "Degrees of Negligence," 6 So. Cal. L. Rev. 91 (1933), at p. 136.
He quotes from O'Keefe v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R. R. Co., 32 Iowa 476
(1871) ; Wilds v. Hudson River R. R. Co., 24 N. Y. 430 (1862) ; Barrows, Handbook
on the Law of Negligence (1900), p. 79; Cooley on Torts (Throckmorton's Ed.,
1930), Vol. 2, p. 645; Shearman & Redfield, Law of Negligence, 2d Ed., p. 42;
Street, Foundations of Legal Liability (1906), Vol. 1, p. 147; and Thompson, Coin-
mentaries on the Law of Negligence (1901), Vol. 1, p. 243.
30 115 Ill. 358, 3 N. E. 456 (1885).
31 115 Ill. 358 at 370, 372, 3 N. E. 456 at 461-2 and 463.
3226 Ill. 373 (1861).
33 70 I1. 211 (1873).
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quoted with approval from the last mentioned case to the effect
that the rule of comparative negligence was "a modification of
the language of the earlier decisions of this court, although not
in fact a material modification of the common law principle. "4
The decision therein, while minimizing the Illinois doctrine
of comparative negligence which had been established approxi-
mately thirty years earlier by Justice Breese, did not operate to
abolish it. In fact, the court went on to say:
Without impropriety, an additional instruction could have
been given that "ordinary care does not exclude the idea
of all negligence, however slight, but that the plaintiff was
entitled to recover, notwithstanding [lihe] might have been
slightly negligent, provided the defendant was guilty of negli-
gence which, in comparison with it, was gross.'
'
5
When, however, it concluded with the remark that the giving
of such an additional instruction was "not indispensable," it
opened the door for the return of older views.
The prevailing attitude of that period was well stated in the
case of Willard v. Swanso'n,86 decided in 1888. It was there said:
expressions may be found in several cases . . . that an
injured party guilty of slight negligence may recover, where
the negligence of the defendant was gross, and the negligence
of the plaintiff slight in comparison with the negligence of
the defendant; but it has always been understood
that in no case can a recovery be had unless the person injured
has exercised ordinary care for his safety.
37
Even up to the year 1896, instructions were still being tolerated
which stated the rule of comparative negligence in terms that
the plaintiff would not be prevented from recovering on account
of his own negligence, if such negligence was slight as compared
34 C. & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Ryan, 70 In. 211 at 213 (1873).
35 Calumet Iron and Steel Co. v. Martin, 115 II. 358 at 374, 3 N. E. 456 at 464.
36 126 Il. 381, 18 N. E. 548 (1888).
37 126 111. 381 at 385, 18 N. E. 548 at 550.
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with that of the defendant, so long as the defendant's negligence
was gross."' But the courts were also saying that an instruction
on the law of comparative negligence could be dispensed with
39
and that it was sufficient and proper to instruct the jury that the
plaintiff might recover provided he had observed ordinary care
for his own safety and had been injured as a consequence of the
defendant's negligence. 40  The exercise of such ordinary care was
held not to be inconsistent with the possible presence of some
slight negligence, for a plaintiff might have been slightly negli-
gent and yet have observed ordinary care.
41
By the year 1892, however, the Illinois Supreme Court began
to display signs of doubt over the point as to whether or not the
doctrine of comparative negligence had any further place in the
local system of jurisprudence. Three times the court raised the
question but, like Julius Caesar, put it aside, undecided. 42 Finally,
in 1894, through the medium of the decision in Lake Shore and
Michigan Southern Railway Company v. Hessions,43 the court
made it clear that it had repeatedly held, in effect, beginning with
the decision in the case of Calumet Iron and Steel Company v.
Martin,44 that the doctrine of comparative negligence was no
38 See, for example, C., B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Levy, 160 Ill. 385, 43 N. E. 357 (1896) ;
Willard v. Swanson, 126 Ill. 381, 18 N. E. 548 (1888); C. & E. I. R. R. Co. v.
O'Connor, 119 Ill. 586, 9 N. E. 263 (1887) ; C. & A. R. R. Co. v. Johnson, 116 Ill.
206, 4 N. E. 381 (1886).
39 C. & E. I. R. R. Co. v. O'Connor, 119 Ill. 586, 9 N. E. 263 (1887) ; Calumet Iron
and Steel Co. v. Martin, 115 Ill. 358, 3 N. E. 456 (1885). See also Village of Mans-
field v. Moore, 124 Ill. 133, 16 N. E. 246 (1888).
40 Wenona Coal Co. v. Holmquist, 152 Ill. 581, 38 N. E. 946 (1894) ; Village of
Mansfield v. Moore, 124 Ill. 133, 16 N. E. 246 (1888) ; C., St. L. & P. R. R. Co. v.
Hutchinson, 120 Ill. 587, 11 N. E. 855 (1888) ; C. & E. I. R. R. Co. v. O'Connor, 119
Ill. 586, 9 N. E. 263 (1887).
41 L. S. & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Hessions, 150 Ill. 546, 37 N. E. 905 (1894) ; City of
Beardstown v. Smith, 150 Ill. 169, 37 N. E. 211 (1894); Village of Mansfield v.
Moore, 124 Ill. 133, 16 N. E. 246 (1888) ; C., B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Warner, 123 Ill.
38, 14 N. E. 206 (1887). Later cases to the same effect are C. & E. I. R. R. Co. v.
Randolph, 199 Ill. 126, 65 N. E. 142 (1902) ; Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Dinsmore, 162
Ill. 658, 44 N. E. 887 (1896).
42 The three cases, in chronological sequence, are Pullman Palace Car Co. v.
Laack, 143 Ill. 242, 32 N. E. 285 (1892) ; A., T. & S. F. R. R. Co. v. Freehan, 149
Ill. 202, 36 N. E. 1036 (1893) ; C., C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Baddeley, 150 Ill. 328,
36 N. E. 965 (1894).
43 150 Ill. 546, 37 N. E. 905 (1894).
44 115 Ill. 358, 3 N. E. 456 (1885).
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longer the law of this state.45  It used that opportunity to restate
what it considered to be the true doctrine applicable to cases
within this class. It required, as a condition to recovery by the
plaintiff, that he "be found to be in the exercise of ordinary care
for his own safety, and that the injury resulted from the negli-
gence of the defendant. "146
This statement, regarded as the abolition of a comparative
negligence doctrine in Illinois, has not only been honored by its
frequent repetition but has been strengthened by added comment
that instructions are sufficient without calling the attention of the
jury to any nice distinctions between different degrees of care
or negligence, 47 especially since all the puzzling refinements as
to degrees of care have been done away with.48  If the defend-
ant's conduct is willful or intentional, the case assumes an en-
tirely different character, 49 but in comparative negligence situa-
tions the law of Illinois has remained without change ever since.50
B. THE TENNESSEE VERSION
Tennessee has gone her own way. The doctrine applied there
may be stated to be one under which the negligent plaintiff may
recover, provided he only remotely contributed to his own in-
jury, but proof of his contributory negligence may go in to
mitigate the amount of the damages. It was one time said in that
state, in the case of Whirley v. Whiteman,5 that if a party by
his own negligence contributed to his injury he could not recover
45 Later cases to that effect may be observed in C., R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Hamler,
215 Ill. 525, 74 N. E. 705 (1905) ; City of Macon v. Holcomb, 205 Ill. 643, 69 N. E.
79 (1903) ; Cicero Street Ry. Co. v. Meixner, 160 Ill. 320, 43 N. E. 823 (1896)
City of Lanark v. Dougherty, 153 Il. 163, 38 N. E. 892 (1894).
46 150 Ill. 546 at 556, 37 N. E. 905 at 907.
47 See City of Lanark v. Dougherty, 153 Ill. 163 at 166, 38 N. E. 892 at 893
(1894).
48 Krieger v. A., E. & C. R. R. Co., 242 Ill. 544, 90 N. E. 266 (1909); C., R. I. &
R. Ry. Co. v. Hamler, 215 Ill. 525, 74 N. E. 705 (1905).
49 On that point see, for example, Prater v. Buell, 336 Ill. App. 533, 84 N. E. (2d)
676 (1949).
50 The case of Little v. Illinois Terminal R. Co., 320 Ill. App. 163 at 168, 50 N. E.
(2d) 123 at 126 (1943), appears to be the last case in which any reference to
comparative negligence has been made.
5138 Tenn. (1 Head) 609 (1858).
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for if, by the exercise of ordinary care, he might have avoided
the resultant harm, he was to be regarded as the author of his
own misfortune. Had the court stopped there, it would have
enunciated the familiar contributory negligence doctrine. It
added, in that case, however, that the mere want of a superior
degree of care could not be set up as a bar to plaintiff's claim;
so there is much in the case to remind one of the former Illinois
rule noted above. The Tennessee court, in fact, relied on the
same English cases as did Justice Breese52 and strengthened
the impression of similarity in viewpoint by finishing up with
the words: "he shall be considered the author of the mischief
by whose first or more gross negligence it has been effected."
But when, in East Tennessee, Virginia & Georgia Railway
Company v. Hull,5 4 a jury was instructed substantially to the
effect that, if the injury resulted from the greater or grosser
negligence of the defendant, plaintiff could recover, but if, on
the other hand, the plaintiff's negligence contributed to the in-
jury, that fact should be considered in mitigation of damages,
so that the greater the contributory negligence the smaller the
amount of damages to which he should be entitled, such instruc-
tion was held to be erroneous. 55 The Tennessee Supreme Court
there said it was unnecessary to discuss the doctrine of compara-
tive negligence, as that doctrine existed in Illinois, in Kansas,
and to some extent in Georgia, since it had been expressly re-
pudiated in Tennessee. 56 The court explained that if, in former
cases, 5 7 it had permitted use of the term "more gross" negli-
gence, or other language which might ordinarily imply compari-
son, in a charge to a jury, it should have been manifest from the
52 See note 13, ante.
53 38 Tenn. (1 Head) 609 at 623. Similar language appears in East Tenn. R. R.
Co. v. Gurley, 80 Tenn. (12 Lea) 46 at 55 (1883), and in East Tenn. R. R. Co. v.
Fain, 80 Tenn. (12 Lea) 35 at 40 (1883).
54 88 Tenn. (4 Pickle) 33, 12 S. W. 419 (1889).
55 88 Tenn. (4 Pickle) 33 at 35, 12 S. W. 419. See also East Tenn. R. R. Co. V.
Aiken, 89 Tenn. (5 Pickle) 246 at 248, 14 S. W. 1082 (1890).
56 East Tenn. R. R. Co. v. Gurley, 80 Tenn. (12 Lea) 46 (1883).
57 See cases cited in note 53, ante, except for Whirley v. Whiteman, 38 Tenn. (1
Head) 609.
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context that such terms signified the "prime, principal and proxi-
mate cause of the injury," as distinguished from a remote cause.
By so declaring, the court adhered to a doctrine announced
in 1879, through the medium of the case of Dush v. Fitzhugh,"
where it had been said:
That any negligence . that remotely contributed to the
. . injury will preclude a recovery, we do not think sus-
tainable on principle . . . the sounder inquiry is, whose
neglect more immediately produced the wrong . . done.
If the injury was . . . the immediate result of the conduct
of the plaintiff to which the wrong of the defendant did not
contribute as an immediate cause, the plaintiff should not
recover . . [but] if defendant was guilty of a wrong by
which the plaintiff is injured, and plaintiff also in some de-
gree was negligent or contributed to the injury, it should go
in mitigation of damages. 9
The strength of that adherence is exemplified by further language
to be found in another case. The court there said:
although guilty of negligence, yet if [plaintiff] cannot, by
ordinary care, avoid the consequence of defendant's negli-
gence, he will be entitled to recover. He is considered the
author of the injury by whose first or more gross negligence,
in the sense of proximate negligence, it has been effected.60
Thus, while a development was stopped which could have
resulted in a pattern similar to the former Illinois rule, Tennes-
see took an important step ahead on the road to the genuine doc-
trine of comparative negligence. True, where plaintiff's neg-
ligence, in cases of mutual fault, is of proximate character, Ten-
nessee does not allow any recovery either. But such negligence,
if of remote character only, is to be considered in mitigation of
5870 Tenn. (2 Lea) 307 (1879).
59 70 Tenn. (2 Lea) 307 at 309.
60 East Tenn. H. R. Co. v. Fain, 80 Tenn. (12 Lea) 35 at 40 (1883). Italics added.
See also Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad Co. v. Carroll, 53 Tenn. (6 Heiskell)
347 (1871); Whirley v. Whiteman, 38 Tenn. (1 Head) 609 (1858).
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damages.6 1 The rule as developed by judicial authority in Ten-
nessee, therefore, came to be one as follows: The negligence of
a plaintiff which contributes proximately or directly to the injury
will serve to bar a recovery, 62 notwithstanding the presence of
admitted proximate negligence on the part of a defendant ;63 but
evidence of remote contributory negligence by plaintiff, although
insufficient to defeat recovery, is admissible for the purpose of
mitigating damages.6 4  It follows, from such rule, that where
both plaintiff and defendant are guilty of acts of concurrent neg-
ligence, so that both acts constitute the proximate cause, then the
plaintiff's negligence, however slight in relation to the defend-
ant's conduct, is enough to bar a recovery.6 5 Where the negli-
gence of each comes within the realm of proximity,6 6 there is
no room, in Tennessee, for a rule as to comparative negligence,
but it applies where the fault on the plaintiff's part is, at best,
only a remote cause.
One special situation in Tennessee requires separate notice.
A statute of that state, part of which had been enacted as early
as 1855, makes every railroad operating therein, for failure to
observe certain designated precautions, responsible for all dam-
age done to person or property occasioned by any accident that
may occur.6 7  Extensive construction of that statute has led to
the formation of a special comparative negligence doctrine ap-
plicable to railroads. Pursuant to decisions interpreting that
statute, the mere negligence of the victim will not defeat his ac-
tion.68 This is true even though the plaintiff's negligence be the
61 East Tenn. R. R. Co. v. Pugh, 97 Tenn. (13 Pickle) 624, 37 S. W. 555 (1896).
62 Bejach v. Colby, 141 Tenn. 686, 214 S. W. 869 (1919) ; Anderson v. Carter, 22
Tenn. App. 118, 118 S. W. (2d) 891 (1938).
63 Anderson v. Carter, 22 Tenn. App. 118 at 121, 118 S. W. (2d) 891 at 893 (1938).
64 See cases cited in note 62, ante.
65 Grigsby & Co. v. Bratton, 128 Tenn. 597, 163 S. W. 804 (1913); Memphis
Street Ry. Co. v. Haynes, 112 Tenn. 712, 81 S. W. 374 (1904) ; Hansard v. Ferguson,
23 Tenn. App. 306, 132 S. W. (2d) 221 (1939).
66 Denton v. Watson, 16 Tenn. App. 451, 65 S. W. (2d) 196 (1932).
67 Williams' Tenn. Code Ann. 1934, §§ 2628-30.
68 Southern Ry. Co. v. Koger, 219 F. 702 (1915); Rogers v. Cincinnati, N. 0. &
T. P. Ry. Co., 136 F. 573 (1905); Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Truett, 111 F. 876
(1901) ; N. & C. Railroad Co. v. Nowlin, 69 Tenn. (1 Lea) 523 (1878) ; Railroad v.
Walker, 58 Tenn. (11 Heiskell) 383 (1872).
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direct and proximate cause of the injury."" Not even gross neg-
ligence on plaintiff's part, directly and proximately contributing
to the accident, will defeat an action based on the statute.70 In
all of these situations, however, the contributory negligence of
the plaintiff must be considered in mitigation of damages.
71
C. THE ERSTWHILE KANSAS VIEW
Kansas, at least for a while, recognized the triple distinc-
tion, in degree, of slight, ordinary, and gross negligence. If,
for example, the defendant's negligence was gross, plaintiff's
lack of ordinary care would serve to defeat his recovery. 72 If,
however, plaintiff's negligence was slight and that of the de-
fendant gross, or if plaintiff's was remote while that of the de-
fendant was the proximate cause of the injury, a recovery was
permitted notwithstanding plaintiff's own slight or remote neg-
lect.73 Here, again, is evidence of the influence of the former
Illinois doctrine, with its modified form of the comparative neg-
ligence principle. But, in 1883, after a trial court had instructed
the jury that they should decide for the plaintiff if his negli-
gence was only slight when compared with that of the defend-
ant, the Kansas Supreme Court declared the instruction to be
erroneous and refused to "endorse the doctrine of comparative
negligence. "1
74
Later decisions to be found in that state also expressed dis-
69 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Sigler, 122 F. (2d) 279 (1941) ; Tennessee Cent. Ry. Co.
v. Page, 153 Tenn. 84, 282 S. W. 376 (1926).
70 Railroad v. Binkley, 127 Tenn. 77, 153 S. W. 59 (1912). See also the numerous
citations in Williams' Tenn. Code Ann. 1934 (1942 Replacement), Vol. 3, p. 42.
71 Tennessee Cent. Ry. Co. v. Page, 153 Tenn. 84, 282 S. W. 376 (1926) ; Railway
Company v. Howard, 90 Tenn. (6 Pickle) 144, 19 S. W. 116 (1891); Patton v.
Railway Company, 89 Tenn. (6 Pickle) 370, 15 S. W. 919, 12 L. R. A. 184 (1890) ;
N. & C. Railroad Co. v. Nowlin, 69 Tenn. (1 Lea) 523 (1878). The foregoing rules
have been made applicable in cases where the fault of the railroad lies In the vio-
lation of a city ordinance regulating the rate of speed within city limits: Louisville
& N. R. R. v. Martin, 113 Tenn. 266, 87 S. W. 418 (1904).
72 Koster v. Matson, 139 Kan. 124, 30 P. (2d) 107 (1934); U. P. Ry. Co. v.
Adams, 33 Kan. 427, 6 P. 529 (1885) ; Kansas .Pac. Ry. Co. v. Pointer, 14 Kan. 37
(1874).
73 W. & W. R. Co. v. Davis, 37 Kan. 743, 16 P. 78, 1 Am. St. Rep. 275 (1887);
U. P. Ry. Co. v. Henry, 36 Kan. 565, 14 P. 1 (1883) ; Pacific R. Co. v. Houts, 12
Kan. 328 (1873) ; Sawyer v. Sauer, 10 Kan. 466 (1872).
74A. T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Morgan, 31 Kan. 77 at 80, 1 P. 298 at 300 (1883).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
approval of similar instructions 75 and refused to make an ap-
praisal of the different degrees of negligence perpetrated by the
opposing parties.7 6 The full doctrine of comparative negligence
never obtained in Kansas, and any attempt to apportion loss, or
to mitigate damage, proportionately to the amount of fault dis-
played by the respective parties, made as little progress in Kan-
sas as it did in Illinois.
D. THE LOUISIANA ATTITUDE
The contributory negligence doctrine proved its attractive-
ness to an unparalleled extent in the state of Louisiana, so much
so, in fact, that it resulted in the practical nullification of an
old provision of the Louisiana code which had, at least in part,
established a doctrine of comparative negligence. Article 2323
of the present code of that state, reiterating a provision first
enacted in 1825, declares: "The damage caused is not always
estimated at the exact value of the thing destroyed or injured;
it may be reduced according to circumstances, if the owner of
the thing has exposed it imprudently. 77
By providing that the damage might be reduced if the
owner of the "thing" had exposed it imprudently, that is as
the result of his contributory negligence, the code spoke in terms
of comparative negligence. The mitigation suggested would then
produce an apportionment in damages to be controlled by the
circumstances; the relative amounts of negligence being the con-
trolling factor. True, the provision of the code spoke of the de-
struction of, or the injury to, a "thing" so it is doubtful whether,
as some writers have suggested,7 the use of the word "thing,"
equivalent to the word "chose" in the French text, would justify
construing the article to extend to all cases involving contribu-
75 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Walters, 78 Kan. 39, 96 P. 346 (1908) ; A. T. & S. F. R.
Co. v. Henry, 57 Kan. 154, 45 P. 576 (1896).
76 Sayeg v. Kansas Gas & Electric Co., 156 Kan. 65, 131 P. (2d) 648 (1942).
77 Dart La. Civ. Code 1945, Art. 2323. See also La. Code 1825, Art. 2303.
78 Hillyer, "Comparative Negligence In Louisiana," 11 Tul. L. Rev. 112 (1936), at
p. 123; Malone, "Comparative Negligence-Louisiana's Forgotten Heritage," 6 La.
L. Rev. 125 (1945), at p. 132.
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tory negligence, regardless of whether the injury be to prop-
erty or to person. An extension of the provision, by analogy,
to include personal injuries would not have been too daring,
but nothing like that has happened.
On the contrary, the Louisiana Supreme Court has not even
applied the provision in question to cases where recovery was
sought for the destruction of corporeal property but rather has
applied the doctrine of contributory negligence to the point where,
if such negligence has been found to be the proximate cause, all
right of recovery has been denied. It is remarkable that the
provision has not been utilized for over one hundred years,
but a short review of the most important pertinent Louisiana
cases will serve to make this clear.
Two cases are most frequently cited as early authority for
the establishment of the contributory negligence doctrine in Loui-
siana. They are the cases of Lesseps v. Pontchartrain Railroad
Company79 and Fleytas v. Pontchartrain Railroad Company, °
both decided in 1841. In the first of these two cases, one in
which plaintiff's slave, cart and mules had been run down by
the defendant railroad, the decision ran in favor of the defend-
ant. The court there, without citation of authority, said: "The
charge of negligence . . .against the engineer . . .is not proved,
without which the plaintiff cannot expect to recover, in a case
where it is proved to have been on the side of his servant. '81
But there is ambiguity in the language for it sounds as if the
plaintiff, had he been able to prove the engineer's negligence,
might have had reason to expect a recovery despite the contribu-
tory negligence of his slave. In the second, the plaintiff's slave
was killed while sleeping on the tracks. Again, the testimony
failed to show that "the engineer did not act with due care,"
which was sufficient to decide the case. But the court, without
justification, cited the Lesseps case as authority and added the
remark that if the slave was guilty of great negligence, or of
79 17 La. Rep. 361 (1841).
80 18 La. Rep. 339 (1841).
81 17 La. Rep. 361 at 364.
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having disabled himself by intoxication, his owner could not ex-
pect compensation for him. Relying on and quoting from au-
thority from common law jurisdictions, it said: "In cases like
the present, where the accident may be attributed to the fault
or negligence of both parties, the plaintiff cannot recover." 2 All
this, of course, was obiter dictum; but it, and the ambiguous lan-
guage of the Lesseps case, together with common law authorities,
proved to be sufficient to establish the rule of contributory neg-
ligence in Louisiana.
In the next case, that of Myers v. Perry,"8 the court, after
having restated the principle that in case of mutual fault the
plaintiff may not recover, and after having supported it with
ample authority from common law jurisdictions, said: "These
decisions rest on principles recognized in our jurisprudence, and
repeatedly [sic] sanctioned by our predecessors." ' "4 The ref-
erence to repeated prior sanction for the view taken rested solely
on the Lesseps and the Fleytas cases, neither of which amounted
to very strong authority for reasons already indicated. But
strong or not, the Louisiana courts have ever since adhered to
the contributory negligence doctrine, both in property damage
cases"5 and in personal injury and death cases,88 although not
without reluctance on the part of some of the intermediate re-
viewing courts. In Mason v. Price,8 7 for example, one of the
82 18 La. 339 at 340.
83 1 La. Ann. 372 (1846).
84 1 La. Ann. 372 at 374.
85 Vines v. Hartford Ace. & Ind. Co., 36 So. (2d) 729 (La. App., 1948) ; Mason v.
Price, 32 So. (2d) 853 (La. App., 1947); Belle Alliance Co. v. Texas & P. Ry. Co.,
125 La. 777, 51 So. 846 (1910); Ins. Co. v. Werlein, 42 La. Ann. 1046, 8 So. 435
(1890).
86 Legendre v. Consumers' Seltzer & Mineral W. Co., 147 La. 120, 84 So. 517
(1920) ; Burvant v. Wolfe, 126 La. 787, 52 So. 1025, 29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 677 (1910) ;
Ortolano v. Morgan's L. & T. R. & S. S. Co., 109 La. 902, 33 So. 914 (1903) ; Rice
v. Crescent-City Railroad Co., 51 La. Ann. 108, 24 So. 791 (1899); Walker v.
Vicksburg, S. & P. Ry. Co., 41 La. Ann. 795, 6 So. 916 (1889) ; Schwartz v. Crescent-
City Railroad Co., 30 La. Ann. 15 (1878); McLelland v. Harper, 38 So. (2d) 425
(La. App., 1948); Falgout v. Younger, 192 So. 706 (La. App., 1939); Inman v.
Silver Fleet of Memphis, 175 So. 436 (La. App., 1937) ; Wyble v. Putfork, 141 So.
776 (La. App., 1932); Wirth v. Pokert, 19 La. App. 690, 140 So. 234 (1932);
Mathes v. Schwing, 11 La. App. 5, 123 So. 156 (1929), reversed in 169 La. 272,
125 So. 121 (1929).
87 32 So. (2d) 853 (La. App., 1947).
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judges wistfully remarked: "In this State, contrary to many
other States, the rule of comparative negligence is not recog-
nized. "' In another case, the court said:
Whether or not the courts of this State have strayed from
the policy and system of the civil law as expressed in the
[Louisiana] Civil Code is a matter we have no authority to
decide, as we are bound to follow the jurisprudence that re-
fuses to recognize the doctrine of comparative negligence. s9
Even stronger is the tacit comment made in Mathes v. Schwing,90
to the effect that were "we authorized, under the jurisprudence
of Louisiana, to weigh the negligence of the defendants against
that of [the victim] . . the defendants would suffer, because
. . . their negligence would greatly outweigh that of the
[victim]. I"9'
How, then, did the Louisiana courts reconcile their deci-
sions, at least in property damage cases, with the clear provi-
sion of Article 2323 set out above? In the first three cases
noted herein, that is in the Lesseps, the Fleytas, and the Myers
cases, no mention was made, in the opinions, of the existence of
such a provision. Apparently the first recognition given thereto
occurred in Fortunich v. City of New Orleans.9 2  A mob had
there done damage at night to certain fruit stands operated by
the plaintiff in the public market place. A recovery was sought
from the city under a riot statute. The municipality defended
on the ground that the plaintiff, by keeping his stalls open at
night, had violated a local ordinance. It was held, on the au-
thority of the provision in question, that such defense, if properly
pleaded, could result in a mitigation of the damages.
Twenty-three years later, in Levy v. Carondelet Canal and
Navigation Company,93 the contributory negligence doctrine was
8832 So. (2d) 853 at 855.
89 Inman v. Silver Fleet of Memphis, 175 So. 436 at 439 (La. App., 1937).
9011 La. App. 5, 123 So. 156 (1929), reversed in 169 La. 272, 125 So. 121 (1929).
91 11 La. App. 5 at 9, 123 So. 156 at 158.
92 14 La. Ann. 115 (1859).
93 34 La. Ann. 180 (1882).
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applied without any mention of the code article, although ref-
erence thereto would have been proper. Eight more years passed
and then, in Factors & Traders Insurance Company v. Werlein,94
the court quoted the article and authorities from other common-
law jurisdictions but came to the conclusion that the plaintiff
had not employed reasonable exertion to lessen the danger, that
is had not used due care to avoid all consequential damage. The
court ended its opinion on a note taken from the Levy case where
it had been said: "If it be true that there was mutual negli-
gence . . . no action can be maintained. In such cases there
cannot be usually an apportionment of damages." 95
Article 2323 drops out of sight in the years which followed
the last mentioned case to the point where one begins to wonder
if the court was ashamed of the provision as some sort of youthful
folly to be laid to rest if not deliberately disregarded. But its
existence was recalled, in 1932, in the personal injury case of
Wyble v. Putfork,96 where is applicability was denied. Four years
later, Hillyer published his exhaustive essay on the subject. The
next year, in Inman v. Silver Fleet of Memphis,9 7 also a per-
sonal injury case, applicability of the provision was again de-
nied. Malone then wrote his essay entitled "Comparative Neg-
ligence-Louisiana 's Forgotten Heritage." As more recent cases,
those dealing with property damage, do not refer to Article 2323
but apply only the contributory negligence rule,91 one is tempted
to speak more nearly of Louisiana's "rejected" heritage.99
The anomaly that a jurisdiction, one equipped with a stat-
94 42 La. Ann. 1046, 8 So. 435 (1890).
95 Levy v. Carondelet Canal & Nay. Co., 34 La. Ann. 180 at 181 (1882).
96 141 So. 776 (La. App., 1932).
97 175 So. 436 (La. App., 1937). Subsequent to Htllyer's article and this decision,
a series of notes appeared in the Tulane Law Review in which it was repeatedly
urged that Louisiana should adopt a comparative negligence doctrine. See 15 Tul.
L. Rev. 480, 16 Tul. L. Rev. 285 and 419, and 18 Tul. L. Rev. 654.
98 Vines v. Hartford Acc. & Ind. Co., 36 So. (2d) 729 (La. App., 1948) ; Mason v.
Price, 32 So. (2d) 853 (La. App., 1947).
99 Reference is made to Franklin, "La Po8es8ion Vaut Titre," 6 Tul. L. Rev. 589
(1932), at p. 604, where he, in connection with another problem, states that a"reception of the Anglo-American law has taken, and continues to take place in
Romanist Loulsiana in violation not only of the texts of the [Louisiana] code but
of the traditional technique of the civil law. .. ."
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ute at least partly opening the door to the apportionment of
loss, should nevertheless adopt the doctrine of contributory neg-
ligence has been ascribed to three main reasons. In the first
place, Malone says: "Contributory negligence was introduced into
the jurisprudence of Louisiana by . . . the ever presence of
persuasive authority from neighboring jurisdictions."' Pressure
of this kind went hand in hand with a nation-wide urge toward
uniformity, particularly in railroad cases, for "there began to
exist a keen appreciation of the need for a substantial unanimity
of the courts in cases where the same carrier was faced with
litigation in a variety of States on a single recurrent set of
facts.' "2
Secondly, economic considerations played an important part.
A fast expanding, efficient, at least for that period, net of street
railroads had been established in New Orleans in which a con-
siderable capital investment had been made. While the trans-
portation system served the needs of the population in a satisfac-
tory fashion, its development was accompanied by an increas-
ing number of traffic accidents leading to a not inconsiderable
number of claims made by victims for indemnification. These
claims threatened to become a burden which the street railroads
might not have been financially able to shoulder. There is small
occasion to wonder, then, that the courts, believing the solvency
and even the existence of the useful car system to be in danger,
should favor the powerful defense of contributory negligenceA
But third, and perhaps not least, was the fact that, at that
time, no other doctrine had been developed or was readily avail-
able for use in Louisiana, as the tradition of an established com-
parative negligence doctrine had not yet been formulated. Ar-
ticle 2323, according to its wording, applied only to situations in-
volving property damage. Other provisions of the Louisiana Code
have been quoted to support the existence of a theory of corn-
I Malone, "Comparative Negligence-Louisiana's Forgotten Heritage," 6 La. L.
Rev. 125 (1945), at p. 140.
2 Ibid., p. 135. See also Williams v. Palace Car Co., 40 La. Ann. 417, 4 So. 85
(1888).
3 For details, see Malone, op. cit., at 138.
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parative negligence, but those references are not convincing. Ar-
ticle 3556(13), for example, simply defines the three degrees of
negligence.4  No provision is there made for apportionment of
damages. Article 1934, sub-paragraph 3, directs that, in de-
termining the damages resulting from the breach of certain con-
tracts, as in case of a promise to marry, or from certain torts,
much discretion is to be permitted to the judge or the jury.'
The measure of damage in such cases may be assessed without
taking only the plaintiff's pecuniary loss or the pecuniary gain
of which he has been deprived into consideration.6 But while
discretion is permitted, there is no indication that such discre-
tion may be used to mitigate or alleviate the effect of the dam-
age. Finally, Article 1880, referred to by at least one Louisiana
commentator as showing a particular adoption of the compara-
tive negligence doctrine, has substantially no bearing on the sub-
ject. 7 Its application is limited to the situation where a vendor,
by error or imposition, has been induced to sell at a price one-
half or less of the actual value. If, for such reason, the contract
is rescinded, provision is made for adjudication of mutual claims
for restoration, profits, improvements and the like. Nothing is
said about apportionment of damages and no apportionment is
intended thereby. All that is contemplated is that, as far as is
possible, the situation which existed before the making of the
contract should be re-established.
Thus, all of comparative negligence that may be said to re-
main in the Louisiana Code is to be found in Article 2323, with
its provision for the reduction of damage in property cases
according to the owner's own imprudence. That provision, in
4 Dart La. Civ. Code 1945, Art. 3556(13). The present provision was formerly
La. Civ. Code 1825, Art. 3522(10).
5 Ibid., Art. 1934(3). That provision appears as Art. 1928 of the La. Civ. Code
of 1825.
6 The discretion which may be exercised is not untrammelled. The existence of
damage must be certain, for the court has discretion only in fixing the amount
thereof, which amount must be related to the facts and circumstances of the case:
Angelloz v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 196 La. 604, 199 So. 656 (1940), and cases
there cited.
7 Dart La. Civ. Code 1945, Art. 1880. The present provision is based on La. Civ.
Code 1825, Art. 1874. See also Hillyer, "Comparative Negligence in Louisiana,"
11 Tul. L. Rev. 112 (1936), at 117-8.
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all probability, originated in the ingenuity of the framers of the
1825 Code.8 The concept cannot be traced to the Louisiana Code
of 1808, to the Code Napoleon,0 to earlier French cases,' or to
the Spanish law1' which, at times, have formed a part of the law
of that state.12  Nor can it be said that Article 2323, with its
theory for mitigation of damage in property cases where mutual
fault exists, originated in the French law prior to the Code Na-
poleon. The Coutumes de Paris, in effect in Louisiana, did not
deal with the question of damage resulting from negligence; in
fact, none of the French coutumes is so complete that it em-
braces the whole field of law or even the whole of private law.
Behind these statutory enactments stands the French droit com-
mun or common law, a composite of Roman law amalgamated
with local customs and with some principles taken from the Ger-
manic law.13  It must be recalled that the Roman law had not
developed a doctrine of comparative negligence.' 4  Nor is it
likely that any substantial contribution for the adoption or de-
velopment of the comparative negligence idea in Louisiana could
have come from the Roman-Dutch law. It is not possible to fol-
low Hillyer's argument to that effect. He relies on the great
Dutch scholar Voet,15 but that writer, commenting on the "barber"
case,' 6 says only that, in case of concurrent fault, he is liable
whose guilt is the greater.17 Direct evidence of the presence of
the essential element of comparative negligence, that is for miti-
gation and apportionment of damages, is missing in that source.
8 See Hillyer, op. cit., at p. 122. Malone. "Comparative Negligence--.ouisiana's
Forgotten Heritage," 6 La. L. Rev. 125 (1945), at 129, says: "The genius of the
Louisiana jurisconsults produced a unique and advanced document."
9 Malone, op. cit., p. 129.
10 See Part I of this article: 28 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REviEw 239-40.
11 See above, 28 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 243-4.
12 Tucker, "Source Books of Louisiana Law," 6 Tul. L. Rev. 280, 7 Tul. L. Rev.
82, and 8 Tul. L. Rev. 396 (1932-4).
13Warnkoenig, Franzoe8ische Staats-und Rechtsgeschiclhte (Schweighauserische
Verlagsbuchhandlung, Basel. 1875), 2d Ed., Vol. 2. p. 87.
14 See above, 28 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVImv 216-8.
15 Hillyer, "Comparative Negligence in Louisiana," 11 Tul. L. Rev. -112 (1936),
at 122.
16 Dig. 9.2.11. pr. The case is noted above, 28 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 212-4.
17 Voet, Commentariu8 ad Pandectas (Job. Jac. Curth, Amsterdam. 1778), Vol. 2,
p. 581.
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It is necessary to repeat, therefore, that all that can be found
concerning a doctrine of comparative negligence in Louisiana is
to be located in Article 2323. Even so, this contribution to the
development of the doctrine is a highly valuable one in any case.
It could have been of decisive effect on the shape of the whole
of the negligence law in this country because, at the time of its
enactment, the so-called "formative era" of contributory neg-
ligence had hardly begun and the doctrine had not then become
firmly entrenched. If, during the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury, the Louisiana courts, instead of nullifying the article by
not applying it, had extended its principle, by analogy, to all
negligence situations in which mutual fault was involved, Louisi-
ana might now be entitled to high praise as the first state in this
country to lead the way to a new solution for an old problem.
E. DEVELOPMENTS IN GEORGIA
A form of comparative negligence doctrine has prevailed in
the state of Georgia for nearly one hundred years,' 8 but care
must be taken to avoid drawing an erroneous conclusion from
the fact that Georgia courts, when dealing with its principles,
have sometimes spoken of it as a law relating to contributory
negligence. 19 The Georgia doctrine, however, exhibits two dis-
tinct peculiarities and limitations. In the first place, the plain-
tiff's damage will not be diminished but will be entirely disre-
garded if he has failed to avoid the consequences of the defend-
ant's negligence after discovery thereof or if plaintiff should
have, but has not, discovered the existence of such negligence.
Secondly, the plaintiff is denied the right to recover if his negli-
gence is equal to or in excess of the fault displayed by the
defendant.
Before attempting to analyze this doctrine, it might be well
18 Recent applications thereof may be seen in Head v. Georgia Power Co., 70 Ga.
App. 32, 27 S. E. (2d) 339 (1943) ; Savannah Electric Co. v. Cranford, 130 Ga. 421,
60 S. E. 1056 (1908) ; and Western & A. R. Co. v. Ferguson, 113 Ga. 708, 39 S. E.
306, 54 L. R. A. 802 (1901).
19 See, for example, Elk Cotton Mills v. Grant, 140 Ga. 727, 79 S. E. 836 (1913);
Savannah Electric Co. v. Cranford, 130 Ga. 421, 60 S. E. 1056 (1908); Americus
Railroad Co. v. Luckle, 87 Ga. 6, 13 S. E. 105 (1891).
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to determine the way in which it originated. There has been some
speculation over whether the rule owes its existence to the ac-
tivities of the judiciary or to the efforts of the legislature. While
the latter seems to have won the credit,20 there is occasion to
commend the courts of that state for having introduced the prin-
ciple as to diminution of damages in cases of mutual fault as
well as for having fashioned a workable system for the appor-
tionment of damages by extensive construction of two rather
meager and separate statutory provisions. The first of these
statutes states:
No person shall recover damages from a railroad company
for injury to himself or his property, where the same is
done by his consent or is caused by his own negligence. If the
complainant and the agents of the company are both at fault,
the former may recover, but the damages shall be diminished
by the jury in proportion to the amount of fault attributable
to him.
2 1
The second provision declares:
If the plaintiff by ordinary care could have avoided the con-
sequences to himself caused by the defendant's negligence,
he is not entitled to recover. In other cases the defendant
is not relieved, although the plaintiff may in some way have
contributed to the injury sustained.22
Both the provisions mentioned appear, for the first time, in
the Georgia Code of 1860-2.23 They cannot be located in earlier
publications which contain the statutes enacted from time to time
by the Georgia legislature nor in the compilations which preceded
the code of that year.24 For that matter, the historical notes ap-
20 City of Ocilla v. Luke, 28 Ga. App. 234, 110 S. E. 757 (1922). See also note
to annotation in 114 A. L. R. 830 at 8M5; 45 C. J., Negligence, § 598; 65 C. J. S.,
Negligence, § 172.
21 Ga. Code Ann. 1936, § 94-703.
22 Ibid., § 105-603.
23 See Ga. Code 1860-2, §§ 2979 and 2914 respectively.
24 Neither Dawson, Compilation of the Laws of Georgia (1831), nor Hotchkiss,
Codification of the Statute Law of Georgia (1845), contains the text of such
statutes.
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pended to later codes, designed to indicate the original legis-
lative source, if any, of the several provisions, fail to make any
reference to the date of enactment. It can only be supposed, there-
fore, that these provisions were framed by the codifiers them-
selves, for they had not been commissioned to create any new
rules of law25 and professed to have "kept themselves fully and
carefully within the pale of the powers and duties conferred.'26
If they did not fashion entirely new law on the point, they must
have found the rule for diminution of damages in certain deci-
sions rendered by the Georgia Supreme Court shortly prior to
their appointment.
2 7
A railroad crossing accident had happened in 1851, the legal
consequences of which eventually came before the Supreme Court
of Georgia for decision on three different occasions and thereby
contributed much toward the development of the Georgia law of
negligence to be applied in cases of mutual fault. The factual
situation involved a mule cart driven by a slave, and carrying a
woman and her four children, which had been run down by the
defendant railroad resulting in the death of the slave, the deaths
of three of the four children, and the destruction of the mule
cart. The slave and the cart had belonged to a decedent's es-
tate, and the administrator thereof sued to recover for the prop-
erty damage, charging the railroad with approaching and pass-
ing the crossing at too high a rate of speed. The railroad, on
the other hand, asserted that the driver, that is the slave who had
been killed in the accident, had negligently tried to cross the
tracks although he had seen the train coming. The court in
that case, one entitled The Macon & Western Railroad Company
v. Davis,28 approved the contributory negligence rule which had
been announced in Butterfield v. Forrester29 but had been modi-
25 Ga. Acts 1858, p. 95. directed the commissioners to "prepare ... a Code, which
should, as near as practicable, embrace . . . the laws of Georgia, whether derived
from the common law, the Constitutions, the statutes of the State, the decisions
of the Supreme Court, or the statutes of England of force In this State."
26 See Report of the Committee, Ga. Code 1895, Vol. 1, p. v.
27 The three codifiers were commissioned pursuant to an act approved Dec. 9,
1858: Ga. Code 1895, Vol. 1, p. iii.
28 18 Ga. 679 (1855).
29 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (1809).
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fled by Lycwh v. Nurdin,8° and said that it ought to be left to
the jury to determine "whether, notwithstanding the imprudence
of the plaintiff's servant, the defendant could not, in the exer-
cise of reasonable diligence, have prevented the collision."'
Following that action, the surviving child sought to recover
for her personal injuries. She obtained a verdict in the trial court
and a motion by defendant for a new trial was overruled. When
reversing that holding, the Supreme Court directed that the rule
last announced should be applied,82 but indicated that, notwith-
standing the fact that plaintiff may not have been free from
fault, still the defendant might be held responsible if, in the ex-
ercise of due care, it could have prevented the injury.83  Adher-
ence was thereby given to a contributory negligence doctrine, but
one which might be mitigated by means of a doctrine of last clear
chance if that chance was open to, but not taken advantage of
by, a defendant. 34  It also said that the rule aforementioned
should be applied to both parties; that the party seeking to re-
cover must prevent his injuries by the use of ordinary care; and
that it was error to deny the giving of an instruction to the
effect that if both parties were negligent and the plaintiff could
have avoided the effect of the defendant's negligence by the use
of ordinary diligence but did not, then the defendant was not to
be held liable. The principle that the plaintiff's failure to use
his last clear chance to avoid harm should serve to defeat his
recovery was thereby established and is still the law in Georgia .3
At the new trial so ordered, the child again secured a ver-
dict in her favor. The railroad again appealed, with the result
that the issue came before the Georgia Supreme Court, in 1858,
for the third time. That body, speaking through Mr. Justice
Lumpkin, said: "It has been argued that, inasmuch as there was
30 1 Ad. & Ellis (N. S.) 29, 41 Eng. C. L. 422, 113 Eng. Rep. 1041 (1841).
3' 18 Ga. 679 at 687.
32 The M. & W. R. R. Co. v. Winn, 19 Ga. 440 (18.56).
33 19 Ga. 440 at 442.
34 The nature of the decision would seem to provide further indication that, at
that time, there was no apportionment provision on the statute books of Georgia.
35 See, for example, United States v. Fleming, 115 F. (2d) 314 (1940).
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fault on both sides, that the misconduct of the plaintiff should
mitigate the damages . . . In a proper case, I am inclined to
think the principle is a correct one." ' 86 Here may lie clear evi-
dence for the establishment of a rule for diminution of damages
in cases of mutual fault, but the principle was not applied be-
cause the slave was not found to have been negligent. A year
later, in Flanders v. Meath,37 the court referred to this dictum
as a principle "which we hold to be sound law . . . [that] where
both parties are in fault, but the defendant most so, the fault of
the plaintiff may go in mitigation of damages. " It was fol-
lowed up, in Yonge v. Kinney,3 9 with an expression to the effect
that a person who is himself greatly to blame ought not recover
full damages. Not until after these decisions had been pro-
nounced, shaping a comparative negligence doctrine, was the Geor-
gia Code of 1860-2 deliberated upon, written, and enacted.
If the Georgia Supreme Court had done nothing else, by
these decisions, than provide the codifiers with an opportunity
to incorporate a diminution of damage rule into the code of
that state, even though it might be one limited to injuries in-
flicted by railroads, its contribution to the development of the
doctrine would have been remarkable. But, after the codification,
the judiciary continued to make other important contributions
by extensive construction of the two statutory provisions men-
tioned above so as to merge their basic principles into one sys-
tem. It has already been pointed out that the text of Section
94-703, which alone makes provision for diminution of damages in
case of mutual fault, is designed to deal with injuries growing
out of railroading operations exclusively. The principle thereof
has, however, been applied to other personal injury cases as, for
instance, to pedestrians who have been run down by automotive
vehicles, 40 to children who have been injured while working in
36 The Macon & Western R. R. Co. v. Winn, 26 Ga. 250 (1858), at p. 254.
37 27 Ga. 358 (1859).
38 27 Ga. 358 at 362.
39 28 Ga. 111 (1859).
40 Berry v. Jowers, 59 Ga. App. 24, 200!S. E. 195 (1938).
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mills or factories,41 and to invitees who have been hurt by trip-
ping or falling in buildings where they were rightfully present.
42
The same is also true in situations involving damage to property,
as a car in an automobile collision,4 3 or an automobile running
against an obstruction in a public street.
44
On the other hand, the courts have also applied the principle
of Section 105-603 to all negligence cases, especially to railroad
cases, where mutual fault is involved. Pursuant thereto, the plain-
tiff may not recover if he, by ordinary care, could have avoided
the consequences of the defendant's negligence. Conversely, in
other cases, the defendant is not to be entirely relieved, even
though the plaintiff may, in some way, have contributed to the
injury sustained. It is in the construction of the first of these
ideas that one again meets the principle that a plaintiff's fail-
ure to use his last clear chance should serve to defeat his recov-
ery.45 That principle is applied, however, only where the fault
of the defendant has become apparent to the victim or where, by
the exercise of ordinary care, the victim could have become aware
of it and thereafter fails to exercise ordinary and reasonable
diligence to avoid the consequences of defendant's neglect.
46
A failure to avoid the consequences of defendant's negligence
before such negligence has become apparent does not preclude a
recovery but will authorize the jury to diminish the damages pro-
portionately to the degrees of fault displayed.47  Recovery is
then allowed, if at all, on the basis of the second sentence of
the section, for it has been held that the "other cases" there
41 Elk Cotton Mills v. Grant, 140 Ga. 727, 79 S. E. 836 (1913).
42 Wynne v. Southern Bell Tel. Co., 159 Ga. 623, 126 S. E. 388 (1925) ; Moore v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 48 Ga. App. 185, 172 S. E. 680 (1934).
43 Lamon v. Perry, 33 Ga. App. 248, 125 S. E. 907 (1924).
44 City of Ocilla v. Luke, 28 Ga. App. 234, 110 S. E. 757 (1922).
45 United States v. Fleming, 115 F. (2d) 314 (1940) ; The M. & W. R. R. Co. v.
Winn, 19 Ga. 440 (1856).
46 Western & A. R. Co. v. Ferguson, 113 Ga. 708, 39 S. R. 306, 54 L. R. A. 802
(1901) ; Americus Railroad Co. v. Luckie, 87 Ga. 6, 13 S. E. 105 (1891) ; Pollard
v. Heard, 53 Ga. App. 623, 186 S. E. 894 (1936) ; Georgia R. R. & Banking Co. v.
Stanley, 38 Ga. App. 773, 145 S. E. 530 (1928); Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v.
Larsen, 19 Ga. App. 413, 91 S. E. 517 (1917).
47 Wynne v. Southern Bell Tel. Co., 159 Ga. 623, 126 S. E. 388 (1925) ; Wilson v.
Pollard, 62 Ga. App. 781, 10 S. E. (2d) 407 (1940).
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referred to are manifestly those in which the plaintiff could not,
by ordinary care, have avoided the consequences of the defend-
ant's negligence.48  It being thereby determined that a recovery
could be possible, the action then becomes subject to the diminu-
tion of damages rule set forth in Section 94-703 which has, as
mentioned above, been extended to cover all negligence cases. 49
Another important extension in meaning of Section 105-603 of the
Georgia Code has come about from its application to property
damage cases. While forming a part of a chapter entitled "Per-
sonal Injuries," the section has been held applicable to cases
of the type last mentioned as well as to personal injury cases ;50
and that without express restatement of the rule.9 1
By carrying the enlarged principle of Section 105-603, as so
construed, over into the area of the railroad cases,5 2 and by ap-
plying the apportionment rule of expanded Section 94-703 to all
negligence cases, the courts of Georgia have merged the ideas
of both provisions into one comprehensive system. Only one un-
fortunate limitation, not expressly required by the Code, has
crept in to burden the system and that is the fact that the plain-
tiff may not recover even an apportioned part of his damage,
is to be fully defeated, if his negligence is equal to or exceeds
that of the defendant.5" The comparative negligence system pres-
4s Americus Railroad Co. v. Luckie, 87 Ga. 6, 13 S. E. 105 (1891).
49 See cases cited In notes 40 to 44 inclusive, ante.
50 Miller v. Smythe, 95 Ga. 288, 22 S. E. 532 (1894) ; The Savannah, Florida &
Western Ry. v. Stewart, 71 Ga. 427 (1883) ; Georgia R. R. & Banking Co. v. Neeley,
56 Ga. 540 (1876).
51 County of Macon v. Chapman, 74 Ga. 107 (1884); Southern Stages, Inc. v.
Clements, 71 Ga. App. 169, 30 S. E. (2d) 429 (1944) ; Lamon v. Perry, 33 Ga. App.
248, 125 S. E. 907 (1924) ; City of Ocilla v. Luke, 28 Ga. App. 234, 110 S. E. 757
(1922).
52 Southern Railway Company v. Watson, 104 Ga. 243, 30 S. E. 818 (1898);
Americus Railroad Co. v. Luckie, 87 Ga. 6, 13 S. E. 105 (1891) ; Central Railway
Co. v. Larsen, 19 Ga. App. 413, 91 S. E. 517 (1917). See also Wilson v. Pollard, 62
Ga. App. 781, 10 S. E. (2d) 407 (1940) ; Southern Ry. Co. v. Parkman, 61 Ga. App.
62, 5 S. E. (2d) 685 (1939).
53 Christian v. Macon Railway Co., 120 Ga. 314, 47 S. E. 923 (1904) ; Brunswick
Railroad Co. v. Wiggins, 113 Ga. 842, 39 S. E. 551 (1901) ; Smith v. American Oil
Co., 77 Ga. App. 463, 49 S. L. (2d) 90 (1948) ; Southern Stages, Inc. v. Clements,
71 Ga. App. 169, 30 S. E. (2d) 429 (1944); Whatley v. Henry, 65 Ga. App. 668,
16 S. E. (2d) 214 (1941); Southern Ry. Co. v. Parkman, 61 Ga. App. 62, 5 S. E.
(2d) 685 (1939); Pollard v. Heard, 53 Ga. App. 623, 186 S. E. 894 (1936) ; Central
of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Larsen, 19 Ga. App. 413, 91 S. E. 517 (1917).
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ently operating in Georgia, therefore, divides all cases into two
categories. Under the first, even though the plaintiff may have
contributed in some way to the injury or damage sustained, he
may recover an amount proportioned by the amount of default
attributable to himself, provided (a) the negligence of both par-
ties concurred proximately to cause the injury or damage ;54 (b)
the plaintiff could not, by ordinary care, have avoided the con-
sequences of defendant's negligence, 55 keeping in mind that plain-
tiff's duty to exercise such ordinary care does not arise until the
defendant's negligence is in existence and is either apparent to
the plaintiff or its existence would be apprehended by an ordi-
narily prudent person;56 and (c) plaintiff's negligence was of
lesser degree than that of the defendant.17  Under the second,
the plaintiff may not recover at all (a) if his negligence was the
sole proximate cause of the injury or damage ;58 (b) if, by ordi-
nary care, he could have avoided the consequences of defendant's
negligence, after such negligence began or was existing,59 and
was, or should have been, known to him; 60 or (c) if plaintiff's
negligence was equal to or greater than that of the defendant.61
IV. AMERICAN STATUTORY LAW.
Although the aforementioned praiseworthy attempts to ac-
cord fairer treatment to the victims of accidental injury, where
mutual fault was present, had been made by the courts of a few
American jurisdictions, it became quite clear, by the beginning
of the present century, that the tenacious adherence to the con-
54 Alabama, G. S. Ry. Co. v. Coggins, 88 F. 455 (1898); Smith v. American Oil
Co., 77 Ga. App. 463, 49 S. E. (2d) 90 (1948).
55 Western & A. R. Co. v. Ferguson, 113 Ga. 708, 39 S. E. 306, 54 L. R. A. 802
(1901) ; Americus Railroad Co. v. Luckie, 87 Ga. 6, 13 S. E. 105 (1891) ; Southern
Stages, Inc. v. Clements, 71 Ga. App. 169, 30 S. E. (2d) 429 (1944).
56 United States v. Fleming, 115 F. (2d) 314 (1940) ; Western & A. R. Co. v.
Ferguson, 113 Ga. 708, 39 S. E. 306, 54 L. R. A. 802 (1901).
57 See cases cited in note 53, ante.
58 Whatley v. Henry, 65 Ga. App. 668, 16 S. E. (2d) 214 (1941).
59 See cases cited in note 55, ante, and Southern Railway Co. v. Watson, 104 Ga.
243, 30 S. E. 818 (1898).
60 Smith v. American Oil Co., 77 Ga. App. 463, 49 S. E. (2d) 90 (1948).
61 See cases cited in note 53, ante.
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tributory negligence doctrine by the judiciary in the great ma-
jority of states62 could be overcome only by legislative action.
Little had been done, in that regard, prior to the enactment of
the two Federal Employers' Liability Acts. Florida, it is true,
had substantially copied the railroad liability section of the Geor-
gia code,63 with its provision for diminution of damage in cases
of mutual fault,64 and Maryland had made the apportionment of
damage rule applicable to cases of miners and clay workers em-
ployed in two counties of the state.6 5 But it was the hazardous
condition under which railroad employees had been working that
did most to stimulate the growth of the statutory comparative neg-
ligence doctrine in this country.
Congress, in 1906, passed the first of the railroad employers'
liability acts embodying the doctrine,6 but it was declared un-
constitutional in part because made to cover all employees of
common carriers whether engaged in interstate or foreign com-
merce, or not.6 7  The second statute, enacted in 1908, was limited
in operation to railroad employees engaged in interstate com-
merce,68 and, with necessary modification, became the pattern for
numerous state statutes protecting intrastate railroad employees.
From thence, it was but a short step to extend the principle to
other groups of employees, to all persons endangered by the rail-
roads, and finally to all people. Since 1906, more than thirty
state statutes of differing scope and effect have been enacted, all
of which nullify the defense of contributory negligence but allow
the fault of the plaintiff to be shown for the purpose of diminish-
ing the amount of the recovery according to the relative propor-
tions of fault displayed by plaintiff and defendant. The federal
government, also, has not been idle, for it has incorporated the
62 See annotation in 114 A. L. R. 830, particularly p. 836.
63 Fla. Stat. Ann. 1944, § 768.06. The provision was first enacted in 1887.
64 See Ga. Code Ann. 1937, § 94-703.
65 Md. Acts 1902, Ch. 412, p. 595.
66 34 Stat. 232 (1906).
67 The Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463, 28 S. Ct. 141, 52 L. Ed. 297
(1907) ; El Paso & N. E. Ry. Co. v. Guttierez, 215 U. S. 87, 30 S. Ct. 21, 54 L. Ed.
106 (1909).
6835 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended by 36 Stat. 291 (1910) ; 45 U. S. C. § 51 et seq.
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principle of apportionment into the Merchant Marine or Jones
Act6 9 and the statute relating to death on the high seas from
wrongful conduct.
70
The purpose of this article would not be served by, nor would
space permit, a detailed review of the statutes mentioned, and
only some of the important features concerning their scope and
premises will be shown. For that matter, distinctions and enu-
merations hereinafter set up are not made with any claim of
completeness. State workmen's compensation acts are disre-
garded as one of the fundamental premises for such statutes is
that the employer should be exposed to liability even without
fault.71 Also eliminated are such statutes as have abolished the
defense of contributory negligence without replacing it with some
form of rule for the diminution of damage. Since the applica-
tion of statutes of this last type will never produce an apportion-
ment, a basic element of any true comparative negligence doc-
trine, it is inaccurate to class them as being statutes relating to
comparative negligence, 72 even though they may require some
degree of comparison between the respective faults of the par-
ties. 7
8
The remaining statutes, those which apply some form of doc-
trine of comparative negligence, are to be distinguished in two
main respects. The first relates to the type of accident or the
grouping of persons and goods to which a particular statute will
apply. Some statutes, for example, will cover injuries both to
persons and to property; others to one or the other but not both.
Some statutes are extensive enough to cover all accidents; others
relate to specific situations, as to master and servant cases, to
69 41 Stat. 988, 1007 (1920) ; 46 U. S. C. § 688.
70 41 Stat. 537 (1920) ; 46 U. S. C. § 766.
71 With few exceptions, the state workmen's compensation acts have removed the
complicated issue of contributory negligence and have made the employer an
Insurer, so to speak, of the employee's safety while on the job. Many statutes
require the employer to insure his compensation risk: Dodd, Administration of
Workmen's Compensation (The Commonwealth Fund, New York, 1936), pp. 53-4
and 508.
72 Peterson v. Silver Peak Gold Min. Co., 37 Nev. 117 at 123, 140 P. 519 at 522
(1914).
78 See, for example, Nev. Comp. Laws 1929, § 9198.
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railroad cases generally, or to railroad crossing accidents. The
second point of contrast turns on the amount of plaintiff's con-
tributory negligence which is to be excused; excused, that is, to
the point where he is allowed to recover at least a portion of his
damage.
In the first of these categories, four major subdivisions ap-
pear: (A) There are four state statutes of general nature de-
signed to apply alike to all persons and all property involved in
all types of accidents. These statutes are to be found in Missis-
sippi, Nebraska, South Dakota and Wisconsin.74  Two other stat-
utes, from Massachusetts and New Mexico, might have been in-
cluded in this grouping but for the fact that they are limited to
wrongful death situations and have been narrowly construed.75
(B) Four other states, without purporting to apportion negli-
gence and damage in all cases, have enacted statutes which pro-
vide for diminution of a plaintiff's damage if the harm has been
inflicted by a railroad. 76  To these four might be added a fifth,
that from Virginia, but for the fact that its statute is limited
74 Miss. Laws 1910, Ch. 135, now Miss. Code Ann. 1942, § 1454; Neb. Rev. Stat.
1943, § 25-1151, first adopted in 1913; S. D. Laws 1941, Ch. 160, p. 184; and Wis.
Stat. 1949, § 331.045, originally enacted in 1931. Mississippi is entitled to credit for
being the first state to enact a statute applying to all persons. It was expanded,
in 1920, to cover all types of property damage: Miss. Laws 1920, Ch. 312. It has
been said that Mississippi has "been more successful than any other state in its
application of the doctrine of comparative negligence." See Mole and Wilson, "A
Study of Comparative Negligence," 17 Corn. L. Q. 333 (1932), at p. 640, and
Whelan, "Comparative Negligence," 1938 Wis. L. Rev. 465, at p. 471. See also
notes in 20 Miss. L. J. 99 at 100, and 17 Temple L. Q. 276. The latter, at p. 284,
states: "In reading the cases one is impressed with the inherent fairness, the
resultant legal equality and the lack of confusion in the administration" of the
Mississippi statute.
75 See Mass. Ann. Laws 1933 (1949 Supp.), Ch. 229, §§ 2, 2A and 2C; N. Mex.
Stat. 1941, § 24-103. The Massachusetts statute provides that if a person "in the
exercise of due care," is fatally injured by the negligence of a railroad or of another
person, recovery may be had within fixed limits "to be assessed with reference to
the degree of [the tort-feasor's] culpability." If plaintiff's contributory negligence,
under such a provision, were to be regarded as a factor to decrease the degree of
the defendant's culpability, the result would be an application of the comparative
negligence doctrine. Massachusetts courts, however, placing emphasis on the vic-
tim's need for exercising "due care," have been rigidly applying the doctrine of
contributory negligence: Gregory v. Maine Central R. R. Co., 317 Mass. 636, 59
N. E. (2d) 471, 159 A. L. R. 714 (1945).
76 Ark. Stat. Ann. 1947, § 73-1004, enacted in 1919; Fla. Stat. Ann. 1944, § 768.06,
adopted in 1887; Ga. Code Ann. 1936, §§ 94-703 and 105-603; Iowa Code 1946, Vol. 2,
p. 1843, Civ. Pro. Rule 97, enacted in 1915. While the texts of the Georgia provisions
appear to be limited in scope, they have been given the meaning here indicated.
See discussion ante, notes 18 to 61.
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in operation to accidents at railroad crossings only.77  (C) An-
other subdivision grows up around the second Federal Employ-
ers' Liability Act and the numerous state acts which have fol-
lowed it, to the favor of railroad employees, by abolishing the
defense of contributory negligence completely where the railroad
has contributed to the accident by the violation of a safety stat-
ute, but by apportioning damage in other negligence cases.78
Some of these differ, however, as will be pointed out later, over
the extent to which the plaintiff's negligence will be excused in
allowing at least a partial recovery. (D) The fourth, and last,
grouping would include those states which have extended the
underlying thought of the federal statute, i. e., employee protec-
tion, to employees other than railroad employees, either by cov-
ering all employees, 79 those engaged in manufacturing, mining,
constructing, building, or other like hazardous occupations car-
ried on by means of machinery,80 or to all employees of corpo-
rations.8 '
The second point of contrast, as will be recalled, is concerned
with the amount of contributory negligence on plaintiff's part
77 Va. Code Ann. 1942, § 3959. The provision was first enacted in 1919.
78 The pertinent part of 45 U. S. C. § 51 et seq., particularly § 53, directs: "In
all actions . . . the fact that the employee may have been guilty of contributory
negligence shall not bar a recovery, but the damages shall be diminished by the
jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such employee;
Provided, That no such employee . . . shall be held to have been guilty of con-
tributory negligence in any case where the violation by such common carrier of any
statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the injury or death of
such employee." The federal pattern has been closely followed in Ark. Stat. Ann.
1947, § 73-916; Colo. Stat. Ann. 1935, Ch. 139, § 87(2); D. C. Code 1940, Tit. 44,
§ 402; Ga. Code Ann. 1936, § 66-402; Iowa Code Ann. 1949, §§ 479-124 and 479-125;
Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. 1935, § 66-238; Ky. Rev. Stat. 1948, § 277.320; Mich. Comp.
Laws 1948, § 419.52; Minn. Stat. Ann. 1948, § 219.79; Mont. Rev. Code 1947, § 72-649;
Neb. Rev. Stat. 1943, § 74-704; N. C. Gen. Stat. 1943, Ch. 60, § 67, which provision
has been extended to employees of logging roads and tramroads: Ch. 60, § 70;
N. D. Rev. Code 1943, § 49-1603; Page Ohio Gen. Code Ann. 1945, § 9018; S. C. Code
1942, § 8367; S. D. Code 1939, § 52.0945; Vernon Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. 1925, Art. 6440;
Va. Code Ann. 1942, § 5792; Wis. Stat. 1949, § 192.50 (3) ; Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann.
1945, § 65-502.
79 Cal. Labor Code 1937, § 2801; Page Ohio Gen. Code Ann. 1945, § 6245-1.
80 Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. 1949, § 43-2-52; Ariz. Code Ann. 1933, § 56-805; Fla.
Stat. 1941, § 769.03. Oregon, by its Comp. Laws Ann. 1940, § 113-612, first enacted
in 1903, had adhered to the contributory negligence defense in its provision as to
railroad employees. In its general employers' liability act, enacted in 1911, how-
ever, it switched to the comparative negligence doctrine as to employees of desig-
nated hazardous occupations: Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. 1940, § 102-160a
81 Ark. Stat. Ann. 1947, § 81-1202.
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which will be excused. Certain of the statutes referred to, whether
of general or specialized application, may be cataloged on the
basis of the degree to which plaintiff's contributory negligence,
insufficient to bar full recovery, will serve to limit his recovery
to a portion of his damage. Under some of them, not even a
high degree of contributory negligence will necessarily defeat
the claim. 2  In other states, under certain statutes of limited
application proportionate recovery is permitted only if the plain-
tiff's neglect is not as great as that of the defendant. s3 Still an-
other class of statutes limits the plaintiff's right to a proportion-
ate recovery to situations where his contributory negligence may
be said to be slight, so that the fault of the defendant appears
gross in comparison.8 4  But in only one state, Georgia, does it
appear that plaintiff's right to proportionate recovery is condi-
tioned on the fact that his negligence must not amount to a "fail-
ure to exercise ordinary care."s 5
No statute applying the comparative doctrine is presently in
effect in Illinois. The first Illinois workmen's compensation act
had provided that if an employer elected not to provide and pay
compensation under the act he was not to escape liability for in-
82 See statutes cited in note 78, ante, except those enacted in Arkansas, District
of Columbia, Georgia, Michigan, Nebraska, and Ohio. In addition, attention should
be drawn to Ariz. Code Ann. 1933, § 56-805; Ark. Stat. Ann. 1947, § 81-1202; Fla.
Stat. Ann. 1944, §§ 768.06 and 769.03; Iowa Code 1946, Vol. 2, p. 1843, Civ. Pro.
Rule 97; Miss. Code Ann. 1942, § 1454; Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. 1940, § 102-1606;
Va. Code Ann. 1942, § 3959; and 46 U. S. C. §§ 688 and 766.
83 Ark. Stat. Ann. 1947, §§ 73-916 and 73-1004; Mich. Comp. Laws 1948, § 419.52;
Wis. Stat. 1949, § 331.045. Statutes of this type, and particularly the one in Wis-
consin, have been subjected to criticism. Gregory, Legislative Loss Distribution in
Negligence Cases (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1936), at p. 64, says it is
"absurd" that, under the Wisconsin statute, a plaintiff almost as negligent as the
defendant may recover a substantial portion of his damage but may not recover a
cent if both parties are equally negligent. A minute alteration in the findings can
make a tremendous difference in the result. The hope that, in practice, such
inequities could be avoided has not always been fulfilled: Nelson v. Chicago, M.,
St. P. & P. Ry. Co., 252 Wis. 585, 32 N. W. (2d) 340 (1948). See also Campbell,
"Wisconsin's Comparative Negligence Law," 7 Wis. L. Rev. 222 (1930); Nunnery,
"Mississippi's Comparative Negligence Statute-Wisconsin Statute Compared," 20
Miss. L. J. 99 (1948); Padway, "Comparative Negligence," 16 Marq. L. Rev. 3
(1931) ; Whelan, "Torts-Negligence--Comparative Negligence Statute," 20 Marq.
L. Rev. 189 (1935) ; Whelan, "Comparative Negligence," 1938 Wis. L. Rev. 465;
and note in 7 Wis. L. Rev. 122.
84 Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. 1949, § 43-2-52; Cal. Labor Code 1937, § 2801; D. C.
Code 1940, Tit. 44, § 402; Neb. Rev. Stat. 1943, §§ 25-1151 and 74-704; Page Ohio
Gen. Code 1945, §§ 6245-1 and 9018; S. D. Laws 1941, Ch. 160, p. 184.
85 Ga. Code Ann. 1936, § 66-402, and also § 105-603.
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juries produced by the contributory negligence of his employee,
but that such negligence was to be considered by the jury as a
basis for reducing the amount of the damage.86 That provision
disappeared two years later with the enactment of the second
Illinois workmen's compensation act. The latter denied employers
in certain specified hazardous occupations, who elected not to
provide and pay under the act, the use of the three common-law
defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, and
the fellow-servant rule.8 7 That section, in turn, was repealed,
88
so that, since 1917, Illinois employers of labor in certain hazard-
ous occupations no longer have the right to elect whether to come
under the act, but are automatically subject to its terms.8 9 There
has been no statutory regulation in Illinois outside of the em-
ployment relationship and the doctrine of contributory negli-
gence, in those areas, retains its fullest vigor and harshness.
V. CONCLUSION.
In the preceding pages, an attempt has been made to follow
the march of the doctrine of apportionment of loss in case of
mutual fault, a doctrine which takes into account the relative
negligent faults of the tort-feasor on the one hand and those of
the victim on the other. It has been shown how the doctrine
started about the time of the Consulato del Mare, how it gained
influence in modern admiralty law, how, during the nineteenth
century, it conquered the world of the civil law, and how, during
the twentieth century, it has been taking possession of a substan-
tial number of countries devoted to the common law. That prin-
ciple of apportionment, now styled the doctrine of comparative
negligence, has become the law in England, in nearly all of Can-
ada, and has, by enactment in the form of more than thirty-five
86 Ill. Laws 1911, p. 315, § 1(3).
87 Ill. Laws 1913, p. 337, § 3. See also Day v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. Co.,
208 Ill. App. 351 (1917), affirmed in 284 Ill. 534, 120 N. E. 480 (1918).
88 Ill. Laws 1917, pp. 505-7.
89 Il. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 139. See also Smith-Hurd Ill. Ann. Stat.,
Ch. 48, particularly the commentary by Angerstein, at p. 299, preceding § 138.
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statutes having to do with one or more fields, been adopted by
more than twenty-five of the United States.
There is no doubt, however, that its progress has met with
resistance in some areas. A bill introduced in the New York
legislature in 1931, one closely following the wording of both the
federal Employers' Liability Act and the general Mississippi
statute, was killed in committee. 90 Another attempt, made in
1947, also failed." A House Bill introduced into the Pennsylvania
legislature in 1943, one providing for the application of the doc-
trine to all cases of mutual negligence, met a similar fate. Con-
cerning that measure, one writer suggested that the bill
should be written into the law of Pennsylvania without a
struggle. This, however, will not come to pass. The law of
contributory negligence favors corporate defendants, insur-
ance companies, and public utilities. They are not subject
to the denial of justice which a strict application of the rule
produces, as they do not come into court in the capacity of a
plaintiff . . . Their opposition to the proposed bill will be
strenuous.1
2
Whether for these reasons, or for others, Pennsylvania so far
has not yet adopted a general comparative negligence statute. Nor
has Michigan, where a similar proposal, offered in 1947, died in
committee.9 3 For that matter, a draft of a bill dealing with com-
parative negligence, prepared by a committee of the Chicago Bar
Association for introduction in the Illinois General Assembly,
and which had the approval of the Board of Governors of that
association, was withheld instead of being submitted at the last
legislative session. 94 One is led to wonder if there may not be
significance in the fact that this stubborn resistance has ex-
90 Mole and Wilson, "A Study of Comparative Negligence," 17 Corn. L. Q. 333
(1932), at p. 643.
91 See note in 22 N. Y. U. L. Q. 458.
92 Note in 17 Temple L. Q. 276 (1943), at p. 286.
93 Neef, "Comparative Negligence," 27 Mich. St. B. J. 34 (May, 1948).
94 See Report of Legislative Committee (1948-49), 30 Chicago Bar Record 391 at
394.
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hibited itself chiefly in those states primarily devoted to industrial
activity and where living conditions are~more congested.
Whatever the reason, such reluctance to adopt so humane a
doctrine is regrettable. Not only has the harshness of the con-
tributory negligence doctrine been pointed out, but attention has
been called to the fact that numerous scholars, and even some
courts, have for decades deplored its existence. The essential
fairness of the comparative negligence rule, by contrast, has not
been questioned. Whatever hesitation there has been to abolish
the defense of contributory negligence or to replace it with the
comparative negligence doctrine appears to have been based on
an apprehension that the apportionment doctrine would be one
too difficult to administer. In that regard, three points are urged
most often by the opposition. They would appear to fear (1)
an alleged impossibility for accurate apportionment of fault and
negligence between the parties; (2) an anticipated prejudice on
the part of juries in favor of victims to such an extent that it
would practically nullify the effect of the contributory faults of
plaintiffs; and (3) such overwhelming administrative difficulty,
should courts be forced to interfere with jury action of the type
mentioned, that the very influence of the courts themselves would
be weakenedf 5 It is submitted that these objections have been
refuted by the frictionless application of the comparative negli-
gence rule not only in civil law countries, where it has operated
for more than a century, but also in some of the common law
jurisdictions, where the rule has been applied for upwards of
four decades.
As to the first, it is true that no system of apportionment can
be completely accurate, but then nothing on earth is perfect. The
whole human system for dispensation of justice is imperfect.
What can be done, however, is to come to a solution as reasonable
as possible under the circumstances. 6 Small imperfections can
95 The presence of these alleged objections is noted by Gregory, Legislative Loss
Distribution In Negligence Cases (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1936), at
p. 53; Campbell, "Wisconsin's Comparative Negligence Law," 7 Wis. L. Rev. 222
(1931) ; Mole and Wilson, "A Study of Comparative Negligence," 17 Corn. L. Q.
333 (1932).
96 See, for example, Franck, "Collisions at Sea," 12 L. Q. Rev. 260 (1896), at 264.
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be disregarded, small inequities tolerated, if the final result is
generally satisfactory. Even these imperfections would be pref-
erable to the serious miscarriage of justice which results from
denying to the partly negligent plaintiff all right of recovery.
But it is surprising that these anticipated defects have not
yet appeared to hamper the workings of the apportionment rule.
Disregarding the good results obtained in the civil law countries,
achieved under the maritime laws of most seafaring nations, and
accomplished by the English Admiralty courts since adoption of
the Maritime Conventions Act of 1911, 97 there has still been time
for some American courts, both state and federal, to familiarize
themselves with the apportionment problem. No special diffi-
culties have arisen, no hidden pitfalls in the doctrine into which
courts may fall have been found 5 Even the courts of New York,
itself unfavorable to the comparative negligence doctrine, are
able to apply the doctrine in cases arising under the federal or
the Canadian law.99
Apportionment of fault and damage by juries presents no
problems more difficult than those which juries must solve in other
types of cases as, for example, determining the amount recov-
erable for a lost limb, for pain and suffering, for a spoiled repu-
tation, or for an alienated affection. They have found a way
through lengthy and highly technical instructions necessary in
other suits. Properly charged, they will be able to weigh and
balance the amounts of negligence of either party and to mas-
ter the strictly factual problems of apportionment. For that
matter, by way of answer, to the second objection, it might be said
that any tendency on the part of juries to favor plaintiffs would
not likely be increased, in the application of the apportionment
doctrine, over that tendency already present in the other situa-
tions just mentioned. If such a tendency is likely to result in
inequities and injustice, trial judges and reviewing courts will,
97 Franck, "A New Law for the Seas," 42 L. Q. Rev. 25 (1926), at p. 29.
98 Malone, "Comparative Negligence-Louisiana's Forgotten Heritage," 6 La. L.
Rev. 125 (1945), at 144; Mole and Wilson, "A Study of Comparative Negligence,"
17 Corn. L. Q. 333 (1932), at 645.
99 Mole and Wilson, op. cit., at p. 647 et seq.
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as they always have in the past, find ways to protect the defend-
ant therefrom.
Only the third objection poses any substantial question but,
on analysis, it will be seen to be unfounded. If anything, the in-
fluence of the courts will be strengthened rather than weakened by
application of the apportionment doctrine for it will give them a
unique chance to remain the determining factor in an area of
law which already has begun to slip away from their control and
jurisdiction. During the second decade of this century, despite
state and federal employers' liability acts with their changes
favoring employees, it was felt that these statutes only served to
lessen the severity of the defenses which might be interposed in
industrial injury suits. Dissatisfaction still existed over the neces-
sity that the employee should prove fault on the part of the
employer. Complaints were raised against the insufficiency of the
compensation granted, against delay, against wastefulness of the
system, and over the fact that an increasing antagonism between
employer and employee was being generated by litigation. Rec-
ords in Illinois, for instance, showed that at least a third of more
than six hundred fatal industrial accident cases ended without
recovery, while in the majority of successful cases one-third of
the compensation was retained by the attorney for his fees.
Worse yet, it usually took as much as three years before payment
for damage was actually received by the employee or by his de-
pendents.1 There is no reason to believe that conditions in Illinois
were less satisfactory than in other states, particularly since the
search for a more effective remedy resulted in a wide-spread series
of workmen's compensation acts.
Desirable as these workmen's compensation laws may have
been in changing the substantive law relating to industrial injury,
one unfortunate side effect lay in the fact that jurisdiction over a
whole complex of claims was taken from the trial courts of the
judicial department and transferred to administrative agencies.
The day could well come when the dissatisfaction with the harsh
1 In general, see Dodd, Administration of Workmen's Compensation (The Com-
monwealth Fund, New York, 1936), pp. 16, 19, 20, 22 and 24.
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treatment judicially accorded to the contributorily negligent plain-
tiff in an injury case will not only result in the abolition of the
defense of contributory negligence but also produce a transfer of
jurisdiction over all injury cases to administrative agencies, de-
spite constitutional difficulties, with a consequent weakening of
the judicial department. Adoption of the comparative negligence
doctrine in those jurisdictions which are still reluctant to act
would not only remove that threat but would furnish the courts
with an efficient tool for the administration of justice in all negli-
gence cases.
The problem, then, is not so much one as to whether the doc-
trine of comparative negligence should be adopted but rather how
that aim can be achieved. Unfortunately, not much can be ex-
pected at the hands of the courts for, of the few who attempted
the change prematurely, most returned to the contributory negli-
gence doctrine. More than one hundred years of application of
that doctrine have left indelible traces behind, traces so strong
that it is doubted whether courts, even if they wished, could muster
the power to break the bond of precedent. Only the legislature,
then, can help. Whether a detailed statute such as the complete
and careful draft prepared by Professor Gregory, 2 or some single
short provision,8 would be preferable need not now be decided.
If some existing statute is to be copied, those enacted in Wiscon-
sin, 4 Nebraska,5 and South Dakota 6 should certainly be eliminated
because of objections already noted. The Mississippi statute7 or
the federal Employers' Liability Act8 are clear cut and do not
suffer from these limitations but, as Gregory has pointed out,9
they fail as soon as more than one plaintiff or more than one
2 Gregory, Legislative Loss Distribution in Negligence Cases (University of Chi-
cago Press, Chicago, 1936), at 156 et seq.
3 See Smith, "A Proposed Code Provision on Tort Liability," 10 La. L. Rev. 253
(1950).
4 Wis. Stat. 1949, § 331.045.
5 Neb. Rev. Stat. 1943, § 25-1151.
6 S. D. Laws 1941, Ch. 160, p. 184.
7 Miss. Code Ann. 1942, § 1454.
s 45 U. S. C. § 51 et seq.
9 Gregory, op. cit., pp. 58 and 72.
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defendant become involved.' 0 Perhaps the purpose might be
served better by a statute following one of the Canadian patterns,
such as that to be found in Alberta;" but further analysis would
require going into details best left to legislative draftsmen. All
that need now be said is that the march of the comparative negli-
gence doctrine has not ended; it still does, and should, go on.
APP NDIX
The text of the significant parts of the Alberta Contributory
Negligence Act of 1937 is here reproduced so as to provide a
basis for comparison with other statutes. It reads:
Proportional Liability for Loss
2. Where by the fault of two or more persons damage or loss
is caused to one or more of them, the liability to make good
the damage or loss shall be in proportion to the degree in
which such person was at fault:
Provided that,-
(a) if, having regard to all circumstances of the case,
it is not possible to establish different degrees of
fault, the liability shall be apportioned equally, and
(b) nothing in this section shall operate as to render
any person liable for any loss or damage to which his
fault has not been contributed.
Degree of Fault
3. Where damages have been caused by the default of two
or more persons, the court shall determine the degree in which
each was at fault, and where two or more persons are found
liable they shall be jointly and severally liable for the fault
to the person suffering loss or damage, but as between them-
selves in the absence of any contract express or implied, they
10 Ibid., p. 72.
1 The text of the Alberta statute is set out in an appendix hereto.
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shall be liable to make contribution to and indemnify each
other in the degree in which they are respectively found to
have been at fault.
4. In any action the amount of damage or loss, and the de-
grees of fault shall be questions of fact.
5. Where the trial is before a judge with a jury the judge
shall not submit to the jury any question as to whether, not-
withstanding the fault of one party, the other could, have
avoided the consequences thereof unless in his opinion there
is evidence upon which the jury could reasonably find that
the act or the omission of the latter was clearly subsequent
to and severable from the act or omission of the former so as
not to be contemporaneous with it.
6. Where the trial is before a judge without a jury the judge
shall not take into consideration any question as to whether,
notwithstanding the fault of one party, the other could have
avoided the consequences thereof unless he is satisfied by
the evidence that the act or omission of the latter was clearly
subsequent to and severable from the act or omission of the
former so as not to be substantially contemporaneous there-
with.
7. When it appears that a person not a party to an action
is or may be wholly or partly responsible for the damages
claimed, he may be added as a party defendant upon such
terms as are deemed just.
12
12Alberta Rev. Stat. 1942, Vol. 2, c. 116. The reproduction is illustrative only
and is not given with any thought that the Alberta statute is in any way preferable
to the Ontario statute recommended by Gregory, op. cit., p. 69. It has been suggested
that paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Alberta statute, by asking whether, "notwithstand-
ing the fault of one party," the plaintiff might have avoided the harm, thereby
raising a question of ultimate negligence, are likely to "continue confusing Juries."
See Wright, "The Law of Torts: 1923-1947," 26 Can. Bar Rev. 46 (1948), at p. 71.
